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Law, morality and the Constitution
In 1988 the Immorality Amendment Act 2 criminalized prostitu-
tion. It did so by the insertion of s 20(1)(aA) into the principal Act,
which it renamed the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957. Section
20(1)(aA) provided that ‘any person who . . . has unlawful carnal
intercourse, or commits an act of indecency, with any other person
for reward . . . shall be guilty of an offence’. Before this legislative
amendment, prostitution was not prohibited per se (see S v H 1986
(4) SA 1095 (T) at 1098F–G). The Constitutional Court had
occasion to consider the validity of this provision (as well as other
sections of the Act which prohibited the keeping of a brothel) in
S v Jordan & others (Sex Workers Education and Advocacy Task Force &
others as Amici Curiae) 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC); 2002 (11) BCLR 1117.
The court was unanimous in dismissing the challenge to the
prohibition against keeping a brothel. It divided sharply on
the prohibition of prostitution, and by a majority of six to five
upheld the validity of s 20(1)(aA). The decision invites two observa-
tions unrelated to its outcome. First, the court uncharacteristically
failed, despite invitation, to engage with one of the leading
jurisprudential debates of the last century concerning the legal
enforcement of morality. Secondly, the tone of the majority
judgment is surprisingly callous and morally judgmental.
The criminalization of prostitution in 1988 was preceded by the
Report of the ad hoc Committee of the State President’s Council on the
Immorality Act (PC 1/1985). The moral disapprobation of sex work
featured prominently in the Committee’s report. An entire chapter
was devoted to the subject. The Committee recognized the obvious:
prostitution cannot be eradicated by measures under the criminal
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law, and ‘the most effective way of combating prostitution would be
to deal with the public manifestations under the criminal law and
leave other manifestations to public opinion’ (para 4.13). A
reading of the Committee’s report could leave no doubt as to its
religious and moral underpinnings. Indeed, the language is
reminiscent of religious zeal. It observed that ‘since immorality, as
reflected in the Act, relates to sexual practices outside wedlock, it is
evident that the strengthening of the institution of marriage within
which normal sexual relations could, and, in fact, in the main do
take place, would be an important means of curbing immorality’
(para 3.14). The Committee was of the view that the state had a
function ‘as one of the custodes morum to uphold Christian moral
values’ (para 3.22.1). It refused to accept that ‘private morality is
not the concern of the State, any less than is public morality’ (para
3.22.7). Hence, whether immoral or indecent acts are committed
in private or in public, the application of criminal sanctions would
depend on the relative measure of ‘abhorrence, shock, disgust,
resentment or censure that society may express’ (para 3.22.9.7).
Despite this strident language, the Committee did not recommend
the criminalization of prostitution. The legislature however,
thought differently.
When the matter came before the Constitutional Court, the
moral issues surrounding prostitution could scarcely be avoided.
After all, the advent of constitutional democracy in South Africa
had a profoundly moral impetus. The interim Constitution (Consti-
tution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993) was
proclaimed by the Constitutional Court to represent ‘a radical and
decisive break from that part of the past which is unacceptable’, a
past which was ‘pervaded by inequality, authoritarianism and
repression’ (Shabalala v Attorney-General of Transvaal 1996 (1) SA
725 (CC); 1995 (12) BCLR 1593, para 26). By contrast, the
aspiration of the future ‘is based on what is ‘‘justifiable in an open
and democratic society based on freedom and equality’’ ’ (ibid).
The question of the legal enforcement of morality was the subject
of a celebrated jurisprudential debate between Sir Patrick Devlin
and Professor H L A Hart (see Patrick Devlin The Enforcement of
Morals (1959), reprinted in 1965, and H L A Hart Law, Liberty and
Morality (1963)). The debate had its genesis in the publication of
the Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution
(Cmnd 247), better known as the Wolfenden Report. This con-
tained a central philosophical point of departure articulated in
para 61 as follows:
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‘Further, we feel bound to say this. We have outlined the arguments
against a change in the law, and we recognise their weight. We believe,
however, that they have been met by the counter-arguments we have
already advanced. There remains one additional counter-argument
which we believe to be decisive, namely, the importance which society
and the law ought to give to individual freedom of choice and action in
matters of private morality. Unless a deliberate attempt is to be made by society,
acting through the agency of the law, to equate the sphere of crime with that of sin,
there must remain a realm of private morality and immorality which is, in brief
and crude terms, not the law’s business. To say this is not to condone or
encourage private immorality. On the contrary, to emphasise the
personal and private nature of moral or immoral conduct is to
emphasise the personal and private responsibility of the individual for
his own actions, and that is a responsibility which a mature agent can
properly be expected to carry for himself without the threat of
punishment from the law’ (our emphasis).
Lord Devlin took issue with this philosophical point of
departure. His central thesis was that the suppression of vice is as
much the law’s business as the suppression of subversive activities.
He argued that it is no more possible to define a sphere of private
morality than it is to define one of private subversive activity. He
argued that a recognized morality is as necessary to society’s
existence as a recognized government. On this argument, one who
is no menace to others might, by his or her immoral conduct,
threaten one of the great moral principles on which society is
based. Since every society has a right to preserve its own existence, it
followed that it had the right to use the institution of the criminal
law and its sanctions to enforce that right. The test postulated by
Lord Devlin was that every moral judgement is a feeling that no
right-minded man could act in any other way without admitting
that he was doing wrong. This was determined by the man in the
jury box. Such a person was not expected to reason about anything
and his judgement might be largely a matter of feeling. Lord Devlin
purported to lay down a threshold for the interference of the
criminal law. He argued that nothing should be punished by the
law that does not arouse feelings of intolerance, indignation and
disgust.
This led to the response by Professor Hart. He addressed what
appeared to be at the heart of Lord Devlin’s thesis, namely the issue
of moral populism and democracy:
‘It seems fatally easy to believe that loyalty to democratic principles
entails acceptance of what may be termed moral populism: the view that
the majority have a moral right to dictate how all should live. This is a
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misunderstanding of democracy which still menaces individual
liberty. . .’ (op cit 79).
‘The central mistake is a failure to distinguish the acceptable principle
that political power is best entrusted to the majority from the
unacceptable claim that what the majority do with that power is beyond
criticism and must never be resisted. No one can be a democrat who
does not accept the first of these, but no democrat need accept the
second. Mill and many others have combined a belief in democracy as
the best — or least harmful — form of rule with a passionate conviction
that there are many things which not even a democratic government
may do. This combination of attitudes makes good sense, because,
though a democrat is committed to the belief that democracy is better
than other forms of government, he is not committed to the belief that it
is perfect or infallible or never to be resisted’ (at 79–80).
‘Whatever other arguments there may be for the enforcement of
morality, no one should think even when popular morality is supported
by an ‘‘overwhelming majority’’ or marked by widespread ‘‘intolerance,
indignation, and disgust’’ that loyalty to democractic principles requires
him to admit that its imposition on a minority is justified’ (at 81).
A significant contribution to this debate was made by Professor
Dworkin in his essay ‘Liberty and moralism’ published in Taking
Rights Seriously (1978) 240. Dworkin’s contribution is significant
because it postulates a test for the justification of depriving a person
of his or her liberty on grounds of morality. Dealing with the
question of homosexuality, he observed (at 254):
‘Even if it is true that most men think homosexuality an abominable vice
and cannot tolerate its presence, it remains possible that this common
opinion is a compound of prejudice (resting on the assumption that
homosexuals are morally inferior creatures because they are effemi-
nate), rationalization (based on assumptions of fact so unsupported that
they challenge the community’s own standards of rationality), and
personal aversion (representing no conviction but merely blind hate
arising from unacknowledged self-suspicion). It remains possible that
the ordinary man could produce no reason for his view, but would
simply parrot his neighbor who in turn parrots him, or that he would
produce a reason which presupposes a general moral position he could
not sincerely or consistently claim to hold. If so, the principles of
democracy we follow do not call for the enforcement of the consensus,
for the belief that prejudices, personal aversions and rationalizations do
not justify restricting another’s freedom itself occupies a critical and
fundamental position in our popular morality.’
The Constitutional Court has not shied away from jurispruden-
tial debate when elucidating the philosophical underpinnings of
various rights in the Bill of Rights (see, in particular, Bernstein v
Bester & others NNO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC); 1996 (4) BCLR 449, De
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Lange v Smuts NO 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC); 1998 (7) BCLR 779 and
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999
(1) SA 6 (CC); 1998 (12) BCLR 39). The court’s failure in Jordan to
address the central philosophical debate sketched above was
regrettable. It was surely directly relevant not simply to the
subject-matter of the case, but to the centrality of the role of
freedom and equality under the Constitution (Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996). That the majority chose
not to refer to the debate is perhaps understandable. It would have
challenged several of the underpinnings of its reasoning. But the
minority would have found significant support from this debate for
its ultimate conclusion.
The second observation about the judgment relates to the
uncharacteristically callous tone employed by the majority. That
tone was one of moral condemnation. While there will inevitably be
a divergence of views on the morality of prostitution, the
Constitution (which binds the judiciary) is itself infused with moral
values. Equality, one of the cornerstones of the Constitution,
envisages a society in which all are treated with equal dignity and
respect. The essence of this ethos was captured by Ackermann J in
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality (supra), para 22:
‘The desire for equality is not a hope for the elimination of all
differences.
‘‘The experience of subordination — of personal subordination, above all — lies
behind the vision of equality.’’
To understand ‘‘the other’’ one must try, as far as is humanly possible, to
place oneself in the position of ‘‘the other’’.
‘‘It is easy to say that everyone who is just like ‘us’ is entitled to equality. Everyone
finds it more difficult to say that those who are ‘different’ from us in some way
should have the same equality rights that we enjoy. Yet so soon as we say any . . .
group is less deserving and unworthy of equal protection and benefit of the law all
minorities and all of . . . society are demeaned. It is so deceptively simple and so
devastatingly injurious to say that those who are handicapped or of a different
race, or religion, or colour or sexual orientation are less worthy.’’ ’
These observations by Ackermann J (who was in the minority in
the Jordan case) stand out in marked contrast to those of Ngcobo J
who, speaking for the majority in Jordan, observed (para 16):
‘If the public sees the recipient of reward as being ‘‘more to blame’’
than the ‘‘client’’, and a conviction carries a greater stigma on the
‘‘prostitute’’ for that reason, that is a social attitude and not the result of
the law. The stigma that attaches to prostitutes attaches to them, not by
virtue of their gender, but by virtue of the conduct they engage in. That
stigma attaches to female and male prostitutes alike. In this regard I
agree with the joint judgment that, by engaging in commercial sex work,
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prostitutes knowingly accept the risk of lowering their standing in the
eyes of the community, thus undermining their status and becoming
vulnerable.’
The notion that prostitutes cannot be heard to complain because
‘it is their own fault’ is deeply disturbing. It is a notion that
inevitably fosters prejudice and marginalization. The minority, for
their part, expressly disagreed that the stigma attaching to
prostitutes arises not from the law but only from social attitudes
(para 72):
‘It is our view that, by criminalising primarily the prostitute, the law
reinforces and perpetuates sexual stereotypes which degrade the
prostitute but does not equally stigmatise the client, if it does so at all.
The law is thus partly constitutive of invidious social standards which are
in conflict with our Constitution. The Constitution itself makes plain
that the law must further the values of the Constitution. It is no answer
then to a constitutional complaint to say that the constitutional problem
lies not in the law but in social values when the law serves to foster those
values. The law must be conscientiously developed to foster values
consistent with our Constitution.’
If the minority is to be criticized, it is because it, too, succumbed
to the notion that the criminalization of prostitution entails no
affront to dignity. The reasoning in this regard is difficult to
fathom:
‘Even though we accept that prostitutes may have few alternatives to
prostitution, the dignity of prostitutes is diminished not by section
20(1)(aA) but by their engaging in commercial sex work. The very
character of the work they undertakes devalues the respect that the
Constitution regards as inherent in the human body. That is not to say
that as prostitutes they are stripped of the right to be treated with respect
by law enforcement officers . . . The remedy is not to strike down the law
but to require that it be applied in a constitutional manner. Neither are
prostitutes stripped of the right to be treated with dignity by their
customers. The fact that a client pays for sexual services does not afford
the client unlimited licence to infringe the dignity of the prostitute’
(para 74).
This reasoning is bewildering. It is difficult to imagine how
enforcement of the prohibition on prostitution can take place
without a necessary invasion of that which is inherently private and
which goes to the heart of the right to dignity. The case law amply
testifies to the sordid methods of law enforcement. Moreover, sight
is lost of the fact that the act in question, sex, is perfectly lawful.
There is nothing inherently persuasive to suggest that its commodi-
fication carries with it the necessary consequence that participants
are not entitled to have their dignity protected.
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The judgment in this case will do little to enhance the reputation
of a court which today stands with the best in the world.
Grudges in the Supreme Court of Appeal
Recently retired Supreme Court of Appeal judge Peet M
Nienaber has given the legal profession in South Africa a curious
(though doubtless ultimately useful) glimpse into the battles
fought by judges who cling uncritically to convention and who are
resistant to change. Judge Nienaber retired as a judge in September
2002, after more than 20 years on the bench (12 in the Supreme
Court of Appeal). Shortly thereafter, in a speech at the
International Bar Association meeting in Durban in October 2002
(later printed as ‘Dialogue with the deaf — Or is someone
listening? (2002) 15 (3) Advocate 37), Judge Nienaber publicly
voiced some reflections on the appellate and judicial process.
He traversed familiar territory in acknowledging that appeal
judges, after reading the judgment of the court below, the record
and the opposing parties’ written argument, form ‘some sort of
impression of where the balance lies’ (‘Dialogue’ at 37). This
‘vague, general feeling of what will be fair in all the circumstances’
is later confirmed, Nienaber says, by ‘the judge’s legal instinct, his
sixth sense, based on his background and years of experience in
practice’ (ibid).
Nienaber’s candid acknowledgment of the judicial process
confirms the by now well-accepted insights of the American Realists
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These insights
— once considered heretical in South Africa in so far as they
emphasized that judges do not mechanically apply some existing
body of rules called ‘the law’, but in fact exercise a measure of
moral choice in decision-making — became established truths after
the 1960s through the courageous work of particularly Anthony
Mathews and John Dugard (see the latter’s Human Rights and the
South African Legal Order (1978) at 366–8).
But the bite of Nienaber’s article lies elsewhere. For he also casts
doubt upon the judicial impartiality of at least some of those he left
behind when he purports to explain what happens after judges of
appeal form this initial ‘impression’. He suggests that there are
‘four factors or permutations to be taken into account’ in
dislodging a prima facie view. These are (i) the facts and nature of
the case, (ii) the type of appeal procedure, (iii) the quality of
counsel and (iv) the degree of open-mindedness of the judge
concerned (‘Dialogue’ at 37).
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As to (i), Nienaber observes that ‘[s]ome cases are simply lost
causes’. Nevertheless, ‘a good advocate will always make a
difference to the process even if not always to its eventual outcome’
(at 38). As to (ii), Nienaber recognizes that the amount of
preparation and forethought expended by members of the bench
bears upon the ultimate outcome. He places stress on (iii), the
quality of advocacy, claiming that ‘in about five out of ten appeals
the efforts of counsel will not substantially alter the ultimate
outcome; in three out of ten bad advocacy can lose an appeal; and
in two out of ten good advocacy can win it’ (ibid).
The apparent point of the whole exercise, however, emerges
from the barb that accompanies his discussion of (iv). He points
out that at provincial level prior discussion of the case amongst the
judges concerned is essential, since ‘the pressure of work requires
that judgments, certainly in criminal appeals, be given contempora-
neously’. In the Supreme Court of Appeal, by contrast, judgments
are generally reserved. Nienaber states that when he joined the
court in 1990 there was a ‘firm tradition, if not a convention, not to
discuss matters in advance’ (at 38, emphasis in the original). He
then delivers the following thrust (ibid):
‘It is my impression, I may be wrong, that there are groupings amongst
some of the judges who thrash out matters amongst themselves before
the hearing and then form a combined and united front at it. That does
not mean that there is silence in court. There are vigorous exchanges
but one sometimes sensed that the purpose was not so much to elicit
answers but to assert, rather than test, positions rather than proposi-
tions. Whether this is true, and if so, whether it is a lasting trend or
merely a temporary aberration, is difficult to say. But if it is the former
the result will be that it will become that much more difficult for counsel
to change the course of an appeal if the consensus of the workshop is
against him.’
The suggestion is extraordinary: that there is a caucus within the
Supreme Court of Appeal that reaches its conclusions in advance
and then gives the impression of individual open-mindedness
before voting en bloc — something, Nienaber suggests, that has
been achieved only by breaching a convention against the advance
discussion of cases.
Perhaps more extraordinary than the claim he makes is that
Nienaber himself is not even sure whether his claim is correct — for
he says candidly that his remarks derive from impression, which
may be wrong. But in a collegial institution impressions can surely
be verified in the event that there is doubt. One must ask whether
Nienaber raised his concerns with his colleagues before he cast the
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slur. For other judges of the Supreme Court of Appeal, when asked
about his allegations, say that he is quite wrong on both counts.
They say that there is no such caucus. Moreover, at the time to
which Nienaber refers the convention he invokes was no longer in
existence. Indeed, it was well known that although such a conven-
tion had previously existed, it was debated amongst the judges after
the appointment of Chief Justice Mahomed in 1997 and thereafter
fell away. Surely Nienaber must have been aware of the debate and
of the change? The question, then, is why Nienaber chose to launch
an attack upon an unidentified sector of the court, giving vent to an
‘impression’ that he recognized might be incorrect, and which
proceeded from a premise that was not correct.
Some years ago Nienaber committed himself to what this chapter
at the time lamented as a myopic view of the judicial office, and
engaged in a reactionary counter-attack upon critics of the
Appellate Division’s functioning under apartheid (see 2000 Annual
Survey 877ff). At that very time the court itself was changing, and
newer appointments shifted its balance away from the doctrinal
Roman-Dutch historicist approach favoured by Chief Justices
Rumpff and Rabie and senior judges like C P Joubert, to a more
principled and pragmatic, outcome-oriented tenor. In the more
recent law reports from the late 1990s a number of instances appear
in which Nienaber found himself on a split bench, and at times in
the minority, in particular from 2001 when a wave of new judges was
appointed. (Examples are Brummer v Gorfil Brothers Investments (Pty)
Ltd 1999 (3) SA 389 (SCA), Vereins- und Westbank AG v Veren
Investments 2002 (4) SA 421 (SCA) and Minister van Veiligheid en
Sekuriteit v Japmoco BK h/a Status Motors 2002 (5) SA 649 (SCA).)
Future readers of the law reports will no doubt determine for
themselves whether Nienaber was merely outvoted, or also
out-gunned, on later such occasions. To the pragmatic shift in the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Appeal must be added the
impact of the Constitution, which before 2001 was barely
mentioned in its judgments.
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, with the recent changes
to the composition and outlook of the Supreme Court of Appeal,
Nienaber was uncomfortable in finding himself amongst judges
who did not subscribe to his judicial views. His audience at the IBA
was unlikely to have had the advantage of acquaintance with the law
reports. On the other hand, his readers in Advocate are more likely
to have asked whether he felt himself superseded in a changing
court.
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Judges and the environment
During 2002 South Africa hosted the World Summit on
Sustainable Development. The summit included the Global Judges’
Symposium on Sustainable Development and the Role of Law
organized by the United Nations Environment Programme. At the
end of the symposium, the judges adopted a statement of principles
known as the ‘Johannesburg Principles’. Agreement was reached
on the following principles to guide the judiciary in promoting the
goals of sustainable development through the application of the
rule of law and the democratic process:
‘1 A full commitment to contributing towards the realization of the
goals of sustainable development through the judicial mandate to
implement, develop and enforce the law, and to uphold the Rule of
Law and the democratic process;
2 To realize the goals of the Millennium Declaration of the United
Nations General Assembly which depend upon the implementation
of national and international legal regimes that have been
established for achieving the goals of sustainable development;
3 In the field of environmental law there is an urgent need for a
concerted and sustainable programme of work focused on
education, training and dissemination of information, including
regional and sub-regional judicial colloquia; and
4 That collaboration among members of the judiciary and others
engaged in the judicial process within and across regions is essential
to achieve a significant improvement in compliance with, and
implementation, development and enforcement of environmental
law.’
The statement of principles is significant not so much for its
content as for its authorship. Ordinarily, international agreement is
reached by way of treaties or resolutions adopted by international
institutions. Judges do not normally participate in such processes.
This declaration therefore represents an unusual, but welcome,
new direction for judges.
THE LEGAL PROFESSION
Legislation
The Reinstatement of Enrolment of Certain Deceased Legal
Practitioners Act 32 of 2002 provides for a process to be followed to
restore to the roll of advocates or attorneys deceased persons
removed for political reasons. Section 1(1) identifies the conduct
that led to the removal from the roll as the ground of eligibility.
Reinstatement by a High Court is authorized where ‘the court is
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satisfied that the conduct that led to that person’s name being
removed from the roll in question was directly related to that
person’s opposition to the previous political dispensation of apart-
heid and to bringing about political or constitutional change in
the Republic, or to assisting persons who were likewise opposed to
the said apartheid dispensation’. Consultation with the deceased
person’s family is mandated, and the name of any person reinstated
will be submitted to Parliament. The legislation will permit
the remedying of obvious injustices. (See generally G J Marcus
and J Kentridge ‘The striking-off of Abram Fischer QC’ in
The Johannesburg Bar: 100 Years in Pursuit of Excellence (2002) at
45–6).
Misconduct by advocates
The case of General Council of the Bar of South Africa v Matthys 2002
(5) SA 1 (E) applied the principles established in cases such as Jasat
v Natal Law Society 2000 (3) SA 44 (SCA) to an instance of
misconduct by an advocate (a member of the Independent
Advocates’ Association of South Africa). With respect to a charge
that the advocate had accepted a brief without the intervention of
an attorney, the court followed the Supreme Court of Appeal’s
decision in the matter of De Freitas v Society of Advocates of Natal 2001
(3) SA 750 (SCA). It ordered that the advocate’s name be struck
from the roll of advocates.
General Council of the Bar of South Africa v Rösemann 2002 (1) SA
235 (C) is dealt with below.
Misconduct by attorneys
The result and reasoning of Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope v
Francois Johannes Budricks (SCA 24 May 2002 (case no 141/2001),
unreported) demonstrate stiffer judicial attitudes towards the risk
of loss of clients’ money than has previously been on display. The
Supreme Court of Appeal has a three-part test for reviewing
decisions either to strike an attorney off the roll or suspend him or
her from practice in terms of s 22(1)(d) of the Attorneys Act 53 of
1979. First, has the offending conduct been established as a matter
of fact? Secondly, if so, what is the value judgment regarding
whether the person is not a fit and proper person in terms of
s 22(1)(d)? Thirdly, if not a fit and proper person, should the court
order removal of the person from the roll of attorneys or merely
suspension from practice? This decision emphasizes the signifi-
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cance of the answer to the first question for the decision on the
second.
On application from the provincial Law Society, the Supreme
Court of Appeal reviewed the order of the court a quo which had
found the conduct of an attorney to contravene s 22(1)(d), had
found the attorney not to be a fit and proper person, and had
ordered the attorney suspended from practice for two years and
conditionally suspended that order itself for three years. The
offending conduct arose from the attorney’s implementation of
subsidy funds received in terms of an agreement with the National
Housing Board.
Hefer AP stated (para 7) that
‘[t]he suspension of [the attorney’s] suspension from practice is entirely
incompatible with the finding that he was not a fit and proper person to
continue practising and resulted in the anomalous situation that a
person who had explicitly been pronounced unfit to do so, was allowed
to continue to practice. (Logically, a striking off order or an order of
suspension from practice should only be suspended if the court finds
that the attorney concerned is a fit and proper person to continue to
practice but still wishes to penalize him.)’
(Cf General Council of the Bar of South Africa v Matthys 2002 (5) SA 1
(E), para 46.) For Hefer AP, a negative value judgement must result
in either striking off or suspension from practice. In addition, the
court a quo had not sufficiently protected the public and should
have considered the possibility of repetition of the conduct
complained of (para 7).
Reconsidering the decision of the court a quo, Hefer AP noted
that the facts demonstrated a risk of loss by clients of the attorney
rather than no risk, even if no loss had actually occurred. In
contrast to the court a quo as well as the decision in Cape Law Society
v Parker 2000 (1) SA 582 (C) (discussed in 2000 AS 888–9), Hefer
AP took a ‘much more serious view’ of the use of trust money
without authorization and the consequent risk to clients’ funds
(para 11). In the view of the court, the proper penalty was striking
off.
In Du Plessis v Prokureursorde, Transvaal 2002 (4) SA 344 (T) the
function of the Law Society as the custodian of the attorneys’
profession subordinate to the courts themselves allowed the Law
Society to prevail in an application for review against it. While a Law
Society’s decision to apply to the court for an attorney to be struck
off the roll usually involves an investigation, the court here noted
that such an investigation is not necessary in order to approach the
court with an application for striking off.
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Potential misconduct by candidate attorneys
From the viewpoint of the legal profession, Prince v President, Cape
Law Society 2002 (2) SA 794 (CC); 2002 (3) BCLR 231 is noteworthy
in so far as it concerns the professional fitness of a candidate
attorney. As noted by the Constitutional Court (para 2), the
provincial Law Society took the view that a candidate with two
previous convictions for possession of cannabis, and who had
declared his intention to continue breaking the law, was not a fit
and proper person to be admitted as an attorney. The
Constitutional Court found that the admitted legitimate govern-
mental interest served by a prohibition on the possession or use of
cannabis could not be achieved by less restrictive means. As noted
by Chaskalson P, by the time the case reached the Constitutional
Court the aspect of the correctness of the Law Society’s decision
had fallen away (paras 93–94, and see also 2000 Annual Survey
891–3).
Attorney’s duty of care to disappointed beneficiaries
Pretorius en andere v McCallum 2002 (2) SA 423 (C) is an example
of the legal system rectifying a mistake by one of its own. The
attorney did not dispute that, through his negligence in completing
the formalities of a will in terms of the Wills Act 7 of 1953, the
plaintiffs inherited by intestate succession lesser amounts than
their father and grandfather had intended. The attorney had
signed the will as a witness but had failed properly to sign the first
page. The question for the court was solely whether a duty of care
existed with respect to such disappointed beneficiaries. Following
the approach in the comparative jurisdictions examined (Canada,
Australia, England and the USA), no reason was found against
recognizing such a duty.
Right of appearance of candidate attorneys
The decision in S v Zoya 2002 (4) SA 362 (W) overrules that of
Hartzenberg J in S v Nkosi 2000 (1) SACR 592 (T). Nkosi had
required candidate attorneys to have issued to them and to bear
certificates in order to be qualified to appear in terms of s 8 of the
Attorneys Act 53 of 1979. Instead, the two-judge Zoya court
emphasized the rule of s 8(1) that after a year’s service a candidate
attorney was ‘entitled’ to appear in the regional court as well as in
the ordinary magistrates’ courts (at 365C–F). Such a decision
appropriately both adopts the reasoning of the relevant provincial
Law Society and facilitates the right of access to court.
1002 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW
JOBNAME: Annual Survey 2002 PAGE: 14 SESS: 2 OUTPUT: Tue Jan 11 18:42:39 2005
/brian/juta/juta/annual−sur/ch31
Waiting for Godot, aka the Legal Practice Bill
Echoing its decision of four years ago in De Freitas v Society of
Advocates of Natal (Natal Law Society Intervening) 1998 (11) BCLR
1345 (CC) (discussed in 1998 Annual Survey 885–6), the
Constitutional Court in Van der Spuy v General Council of the Bar of
South Africa (Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development,
Advocates for Transformation and Law Society of South Africa
Intervening) 2002 (5) SA 392 (CC); 2002 (10) BCLR 1092 again
found it inappropriate to decide the constitutionality of the referral
rule. The substance of this issue has been canvassed in De Freitas v
Society of Advocates of Natal 2001 (3) SA 750 (SCA). As the court
noted in para 16 of Van der Spuy, ‘[t]he debate has been raging for
some years about the place, if any, the referral rule ought to occupy
in present-day legal practice in South Africa, its relevance to access
to justice, the extent to which it should be enforced and who should
enforce or police it’. Nonetheless, the court refused to grant direct
access in part because ‘both the narrow and the broader issues are
currently being canvassed and debated in a number of forums,
more particularly within and amongst all the branches of the legal
profession’ (para 17). This course of action appears wise, especially
in view of the submissions of the Minister of Justice and
Constitutional Development regarding the Legal Practice Bill. Still,
at some point in such a prolonged debate, the court may need to
flex its supervisory or its constitutional power. Until such a time as
either the Constitutional Court or the legislature pronounces, the
legal profession will be faced with skirmishes as well as the opening
up of new fronts for attack.
One could classify as a skirmish the court’s decision in General
Council of the Bar of South Africa v Rösemann 2002 (1) SA 235 (C).
Here professional misconduct by an advocate was found in his
accepting and performing work normally done by an attorney. The
ordered sanction was a suspension of two months. Doctrinally, this
is presented correctly as a straightforward application of the
provincial division decisions in General Council of the Bar of South
Africa v Van der Spuy 1999 (1) SA 577 (T) and Society of Advocates of
Natal v De Freitas (Natal Law Society Intervening) 1997 (4) SA 1134
(N). Those decisions, as well as the decisions in those matters on
appeal, affirm the line that the advocate’s profession is one of
forensic skills and the giving of expert advice while the attorney’s
profession is one of factual investigation, the issuing and serving of
process, the production of documents, witnesses and evidence, and
the execution of judgments.
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Yet in at least four ways, this case is an exemplar of the waves of
change currently pushing up against the seawall separating the
attorney’s and the advocate’s profession. First, the sanction itself —
a suspension of two months — is clearly a light one. This is all the
more so given that it was preceded by an earlier court order
against the respondent in more or less similar circumstances.
Secondly, that earlier court order itself is, as the court here points
out (at 249H), capable of being interpreted to allow the advocate
respondent to perform some of the work of an attorney. While the
court here did not follow that interpretation — sticking instead to
the strict Van der Spuy and De Freitas line of division — the mere fact
of the interpretation’s being plausible and acknowledged to be so
indicates that the dividing line between advocates and attorneys is
blurring. Thirdly, the court acknowledges that the respondent may
have had a bona fide belief in the propriety of some of his actions in
part because of advice offered by colleagues in the Independent
Association of Advocates of South Africa and because of advice
offered by a legal academic (at 248E–H). The court’s conclusion on
the mens rea issue here also points to the degree to which good
faith belief exists in the blurring of this particular professional line.
Finally, the matter itself is an example of the blurring. If the
conclusions of Van der Spuy and De Freitas were indeed so clear,
would the General Council of the Bar need to be an applicant in a
case such as this?
The competition law points raised in Commissioner, Competition
Commission v General Council of the Bar of South Africa 2002 (6) SA 606
(SCA) qualify perhaps as a new front in this campaign. The case
represents the application of new regime of competition rules to
the legal profession itself, or more precisely the advocates’ section
of the profession. Rather than remitting the matter to the
Competition Commission after its admitted non-compliance with
procedural fairness, the High Court had exempted three rules of
the advocates’ section of the profession bearing on competition:
the referral rule, the prohibition on accepting briefs with
non-members, and the rule generally precluding members from
accepting briefs on a contingency basis. The Supreme Court of
Appeal upheld the Commission’s appeal with respect to the last two
of those rules, but left the referral rule exempted and termed it ‘the
law of the land’ (para 19) after De Freitas.
Appropriately, the Supreme Court of Appeal was candidly
realistic in its view of its own powers of perception with respect to
applying competition policy to the legal profession (see paras 15
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and 18). The court’s formal self-limitation to matters of statutory
interpretation and their immediate consequences is perhaps
especially appropriate where the two parties are clearly engaged in
a sharp contest, albeit one over regulatory authority. The court’s
decision to uphold in part the exercise of remedial power by the
court a quo was based instead upon the procedural unfairness the
alternative would cause both parties. Apart from its significance for
the legal profession, the case poses several interesting issues for
administrative law. These include whether a statutory authority
granted jurisdiction over a particular matter but also granted
exemption authority with respect to that matter may exercise that
exemption authority in a way that serves the objectives of the statute
but nonetheless contravenes the common law.
Trust accounts and failing banks
The case of Louw NO v S J Coetzee (SCA 29 November 2002 (case
no 342/02), unreported) reversed the decision of the High Court
in S J Coetzee Inc v Louw NO 2002 (5) SA 602 (T). Section 78 of the
Attorneys Act 53 of 1979 regulates trust banking accounts opened
by a practitioner for deposit of moneys they have accepted from
their clients in trust. Subsection (2A) requires such accounts to be
specifically identified. If the bank goes under, do such trust
accounts enjoy any specific protection? The understood answer
prior to 2001 was in the negative. However, some attorneys brought
the issue up again when Saambou Bank Ltd was placed under
curatorship in February 2002, citing the recently enacted s 5(8)(a)
of the Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28 of 2001.
Agreeing with the attorneys, the Transvaal Provincial Division ruled
that such accounts did enjoy protection. Saambou’s curator then
appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal. Hearing argument that
if the decision were upheld, no bank would agree to open a trust
account for an attorney, Lewis AJA disagreed with the court a quo
on the interpretation of the Financial Institutions Act and upheld
the appeal. Attorneys’ trust funds receive no special treatment from
bank curators.
Trust accounts and failing lawyers
In the case of Natal Law Society v Stokes & another 2002 (3) SA 189
(N) not only was the first respondent, an attorney, sequestrated in
November 2000 but he also chose to flee the country. As a result, his
files were in the sights of both the curator appointed for the Law
Society for the trust account and the trustee of the insolvent estate.
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The trustee obtained possession of the 8 000 files (many relating to
matters with the Road Accident Fund) first. The curator wanted the
court to order the upliftment of the files. Noting that the authority
for the appointment of the curator was discretionary and that this
situation was a complex one (at 192G–I), the court allowed the
trustee to retain possession and merely ordered the trustee to grant
the curator access to the files in order for the curator to perform his
obligations. Reasoning in part that an attorney was less of an artist
and more of an intellectual journeyman, the court thus viewed the
practice of an attorney as a going business concern.
POLICE
Legislation
Section 57 of the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995 has
been repealed. This section, which was taken over from the
previous Act, the Police Act 7 of 1958, restricted the ability of
litigants to pursue an action against the police service by providing
that the legal proceedings had to be instituted before the expiry of
a period of 12 calendar months after the date upon which the
claimant became aware of the alleged act or omission or after the
date upon which the claimant might be reasonably expected to
have become aware of the alleged act or omission, whichever was
the earlier date.
The purpose of this section was said to be that it afforded the
Minister of Safety and Security an opportunity to investigate claims
against the Department while the facts were fresh and the evidence
still available. It was thus aimed at allowing the Minister to take steps
to collect evidence and at affording him an opportunity to avoid
litigation by settling legitimate claims. See in this regard Tshabalala
v Minister van Veiligheid en Sekuriteit [2001] 3 All SA 620 (W).
This section has been abolished in terms of the Institution of
Legal Proceedings against Certain Organs of State Act 40 of 2002.
The preamble to the Act sets out the justification for this repeal
inter alia as follows:
‘RECOGNISING THAT certain provisions of existing laws provide for —
* different notice periods for the institution of legal proceedings
against certain organs of state in respect of the recovery of debts;
* different periods of prescription in respect of such debts;
. . .
AND RECOGNISING the need to harmonise and create uniformity in
respect of the provisions of existing laws which provide for—
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* different notice periods for the institution of legal proceedings
against certain organs of state for the recovery of a debt, by
substituting those notice periods with a uniform notice period which
will apply in respect of the institution of legal proceedings against
certain organs of state for the recovery of a debt;
* different periods of prescription, by making the provisions of
Chapter 3 of the Prescription Act, 1969, applicable to all debts. . . .’
This is a much-needed legislative move in the direction of equality
of proceedings in so far as the recovery of debts from whatever
source is concerned. It puts to an end a most unfortunate history in
which litigants who were subjected to police misconduct found it
almost impossible to launch proceedings timeously.
Statistics
Unfortunately no reliable statistics have been produced (as at 31
May 2003) as far as 2002 is concerned. It is to be regretted that
neither the Department of Safety and Security nor the Commis-
sioner of the South African Police Service is able to produce
accessible and reliable statistics which illustrate the patterns of
criminal behaviour in the country.
Case law
In Stoman v Minister of Safety and Security & others 2002 (3) SA 468
(T) the commitment of the South African Police Service to a
programme of affirmative action was subjected to judicial scrutiny.
A black policeman had been appointed to a post instead of the
applicant, a white policeman. The latter then approached the court
for an order setting aside the decision not to appoint him to the
post and rather to appoint the black policeman.
The applicant’s case was that he was the most suitable candidate
in that he had achieved the highest percentage points in respect of
the relevant test for the post. The Minister contended that the relief
sought by applicant ignored the fact that the police service was
obliged to give effect to the application of the policy of affirmative
action, particularly within the context of the Employment Equity
Act 35 of 1998. Furthermore, he contended that the black
policeman had the necessary expertise and experience to be
appointed to the post independently, the superior formal
qualifications of the applicant notwithstanding.
Van der Westhuizen J distanced himself from the approach
previously adopted by Swart J in Public Servants Association of South
Africa v Minister of Justice 1997 (3) SA 925 (T), and in particular the
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finding that the appointment of a candidate from one race group
above a candidate from another race group is acceptable only
where the candidates all have broadly the same qualifications and
merits. As Van der Westhuizen J said (at 482B–C), ‘[t]o allow
considerations regarding representivity and affirmative action to
play a role only on this very limited level would be too restrictive to
give meaningful effect to the constitutional provision for such
measures and the ideal of achieving equality. All that it would mean
is that, for example, race could then be taken into account rather
than other preferences which are not related to qualifications or
merits.’
Of particular significance to the structuring of a future South
African police force is the following dictum (at 482D–E):
‘A police service, for example, could hardly be efficient if its
composition is not at all representative of the population or community
it is supposed to serve. This view may depend on how one perceives
efficiency, of course. A ruthless and draconian police force may be
‘‘efficient’’ in the sense that it rules with an iron fist and ensures some
stability and safety over the short term; but it could hardly be efficient in
the long run if it does not enjoy the trust, co-operation and the support
of the community because the members of the force, including those in
commanding positions, are all perceived to be representative of a




According to the Annual Report 2002/2003 of the Office of the
Inspecting Judge, as at 28 February 2003 there were 188 307
prisoners who were ‘crammed into prisons with a capacity for
110 924 prisoners’ (Annual Report 24). The prison population of
188 307 prisoners was made up of 130 449 sentenced prisoners and
57 858 awaiting-trial prisoners. The number of prisoners serving
sentences of more than 20 years increased from 1 885 in January
1995 to 7 885 in September 2002; those sentenced to between 15
and 20 years rose from 2 660 in 1995 to 8 355 in January 2003; and
those with terms of 10 to 15 years from 6 168 in 1995 to 18 956 in
January 2003. Over the same period the number of prisoners
serving sentences of two to ten years hardly increased, going from
61 181 in January 1995 to 68 418 in January 2003. The number of
prisoners serving life sentences increased from 2 951 in 1996 to
5 505 in 2002 (at 29–30).
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Deaths in prison are divided into two categories, ‘unnatural’
deaths (that is, deaths as a result of violence and suicide) and
‘natural’ deaths (resulting from illness). The number of unnatural
deaths remained relatively constant, with 60 such deaths having
been recorded in 1995 compared with 54 recorded in 2002. By
contrast, natural deaths increased rapidly from 211 in 1996 to 1 389
in 2002. The Inspecting Judge reports that the natural deaths
appeared to be caused mainly by HIV/AIDS.
Case law
In Minister of Correctional Services & others v Kwakwa & another
2002 (1) SACR 705 (SCA) the court dealt with the rights of
unsentenced prisoners. Acting in terms of s 22 of the Correctional
Services Act 8 of 1959, the Department of Correctional Services
introduced a new system in terms of which privileges were granted
on a differential basis to prisoners in specified categories. Pursuant
to this new policy, several privileges previously enjoyed by
unsentenced prisoners were restricted or withdrawn. The effect of
this change on the first applicant was described by Navsa JA thus
(para 16):
‘[T]he first applicant had the use in her cell of a television set, a compact
disc player and a radio/tape hi-fi combination all of which were owned
by her. Prison authorities took the television set away and her compact
disc player was removed from the hi-fi combination set. The new
privilege system allows A group prisoners to have these as cassette
players. Unsentenced prisoners are denied the use of cassette players.
The removal of the first applicant’s compact disc player and television
set should be seen against the fact that the new system denies all
unsentenced prisoners access to the prison library. The new system
allows all sentenced prisoners access to the prison library. The first
applicant complained that although the new privilege system does not
provide for study and developmental programmes, the practice in the
Pretoria prison is that study programmes for sentenced prisoners are
conducted and they are permitted to enrol, at own cost, with outside
distance education institutions. No such courses are conducted for
unsentenced prisoners.’
Noting that ‘the rigidity of the new system does not allow for cases
where the circumstances are such that applying the norm would be
oppressive’, Navsa JA referred to the First United Nations Congress
on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders which
had recommended standard minimum rules for the treatment of
prisoners (para 32). He concluded (ibid): ‘Standardisation per se
cannot be justification for an infringement of prisoners’ rights.’
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Examining the context in which the applicants found themselves,
Navsa JA held that the new system was based on the assumption
that an awaiting-trial prisoner would remain in prison for a short
time. This was patently not the case. Furthermore, the practice
discriminated against unsentenced prisoners in a manner that was
unjustified in logic or law (para 32). While it found that it was not
for a court to ‘fashion a workable privilege system’ (para 36), the
court held that the flaws in the system developed by the
Department were so significant, and the discrimination against
unsentenced prisoners so fundamental, that the system in respect
of unsentenced prisoners had to be set aside.
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